

Message Text

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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 4 AMMAN 3952

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C O R R E C T E D C O P Y - T E X T

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TAGS: PGOV, PBOR, MASS, JO, US, XF
SUBJECT: U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE FOR JORDAN

REF: A) AMMAN 3951, B) AMMAN QTTO

SUMMARY: THIS IS THE SECOND OF THREE CABLES WHICH EVALUATES AND DISCUSSES JORDAN'S MILITARY ASSISTANCE REQUEST PRESENTED TO SECRETARY VANCE BY KING HUSSEIN IN DECEMBER, 1977. THE FIRST CABLE ASSESSES THE MILITARY THREATS AND THE LIST OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT JORDAN DESIRES. THIS CABLE EXAMINES THE POLITICAL CONTEXT OF THE REQUEST. WE WILL WANT TO ASSURE THE MAINTENANCE OF A STABLE AND MODERATE JORDAN WHETHER OR NOT THE CURRENT PEACE PROCESS LEADS TO A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT. THERE ARE CONSIDERABLE RISKS TO JORDAN IN ENTERING THE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS. KING HUSSEIN WILL WANT TO BE ASSURED NOT ONLY THAT THERE WILL EVENTUALLY BE AN ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION TO THE WEST BANK PROBLEM, BUT ALSO THAT JORDAN WILL BE ABLE TO MOUNT A REASONABLY EFFECTIVE DEFENSE AGAINST MILITARY THREATS THAT MIGHT EMERGE FROM REJECTIONISTS IF HE JOINS ULTIMATELY SUCCESSFUL NEGOTIATIONS, OR IF NEGOTIATIONS FAIL. WE BELIEVE THAT IF WE EXPECT HUSSEIN TO JOIN NEGOTIATIONS

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WE MUST BE PREPARED TO PROVIDE A LARGE PART OF THE ADDITIONAL MILITARY ASSISTANCE WHICH HE HAS REQUESTED. THERE ARE SEVERAL OPTIONS FOR FUNDING SUCH ASSISTANCE; WE FAVOR INITIATING A PROGRAM OF FMS CREDIT REPAYED BY AN ARAB CONSORTIUM PLUS GRANT AID OR CREDIT FORGIVENESS ON THE ISRAELI MODEL FOR JORDAN AS THE PRIMARY FUNDING MECHANISM. END SUMMARY.

1. IT IS BY NOW A TRUISM THAT SADAT INITIATIVE AND OUR UNPRECEDENTED, CONCENTRATED EFFORTS TO SECURE COMPREHENSIVE PEACE HAVE CREATED A NEW POLITICAL SITUATION AND NEW CONTEXT FOR DISCUSSIONS OF POSSIBLE FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS. WHATEVER THE FATE OF THE PEACE PROCESS, IT GUARANTEES A NEW SITUATION AT ITS END.

2. SHOULD A DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES FOR NEGOTIATION ON THE WEST BANK AND GAZA BE WORKED OUT WHICH COULD OPEN THE WAY TO JORDAN JOINING THE PEACE PROCESS, JORDAN COULD COME UNDER STRONG MILITARY AND TERRORIST PRESSURES FROM A REJECTIONIST SYRIA AND/OR IRAQ, THE PLO, AND MORE REMOTELY FROM LIBYA AND ALGERIA. IN THIS CONNECTION, WE NOTE WITH INTEREST EMBASSY DAMASCUS' VIEW (DAMASCUS 2269) THAT PRESIDENT ASSAD'S POLICY "HAS BEEN AND WILL CONTINUE TO BE DESIGNED TO PREVENT A BILATERAL EGYPTIAN SETTLEMENT OR A SETTLEMENT BY AN ARAB MODERATE COALITION WHICH EXCLUDES SYRIA," AND EMBASSY DAMASCUS' CONCLUSION THAT ASSAD /MAY BE ABLE TO STALL EFFORTS TO MOVE JORDAN INTO AN EXPANDED NEGOTIATION UNLESS THE ARAB MODERATES ARE CONVINCED THE UNITED STATES WOULD FORCE THE PACE ON THE OUTSTANDING ISSUES RAISED BY OHE DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES."

3. WE BELIEVE THAT EVEN IF THE U.S. FORCED THE PACE ON
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THE ISSUES REAISED BY THE DELCARATION OF PRINCIPLES, THE POSSIBILITY OF THREATS FROM (IF NOT FROM SYRIA), COMBINED WITH POSSIBLY HEIGHTENED INTERNAL SUBVERSION BY VARIOUS PLO GROUPS, WOULD PRESENT A REAL SECURITY THREAT TO JORDAN. TO BE ABLE TO ENTER NEGOTIATIONS, KING HUSSEIN WOULD NEED TO ENSURE HIS DEFENSES. HE HAS STATED THIS TO US EXPLICITLY. WE WOULD NEED TO DEMONSTRATE THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO SUPPORT JORDAN OVER THE LONG HAUL OF NEGOTIATIONS AS WELL AS ASSIST IN MAINTAINING JORDAN'S SECURITY AND INTEGRITY IN WHATEVER SETTLEMENT EVOLVES FROM NEGOTIATIONS. IF WE ARE NOT PREPARED TO FORCE THE PACE ON NEGOTIATION ISSUES, OUR ASSISTANCE WOULD BE EVEN MORE NECESSARY TO ENABLE JORDANIAN PARTICIPATION. (IT SHOULD BE ADDED THAT THERE MIGHT BE A PARTICULAR DANGER FROM SYRIA IF THERE WERE A CHANGE OF REGIME THERE. JORDANIANS ARE ALREADY CONCERNED THAT RECENT GOVERNMENT AND INTERNAL SHIFTS IN SYRIA MAY FORESHADOW POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS THAT WOULD ADVERSELY

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AFFECT JORDANIAN RELATIONS WITH SYRIA.)

4. WITHIN JORDAN OUR ASSURANCES OF LONGER-TERM SUPPORT MAY BE PARTICULARLY NECESSARY TO OVERCOME THE RELUCTANCE OF THE JAF TO SEE THE KING JOIN NEGOTIATIONS. THE ARMY, THE MAIN PILLAR OF THE REGIME, HAS BEEN COOL TO ANY REINVOLVEMENT IN WEST BANK AFFAIRS. IT MAY TAKE ALL THE KING'S PERSUASIVE POWERS AND OUR DEMONSTRATION OF A LONG-TERM INTEREST IN THE JAF TO OVERCOME THE ARMY'S RELUCTANCE TO ENTER NEGOTIATIONS THAT COULD LEAD TO A MILITARY CONFRONTATION FOR WHICH THEY WOULD NOT BE PREPARED UNLESS WE EXPAND AND EXPEDITE OUR ASSISTANCE. KING IS A SHREWD JUDGE OF HIS DOMESTIC CONSTITUENCY AND HE IS TELLING US HE NEEDS ADDITIONAL MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO ENABLE HIM TO TAKE PART IN NEGOTIATIONS WHEN THE TIME IS RIGHT. WE BELIEVE WE SHOULD GIVE HEAVY WEIGHT TO HIS RECOMMENDATIONS.

5. ON THE OTHER HAND, IF PEACE TALKS ULTIMATELY TERMINATE WITHOUT A LASTING SETTLEMENT, MANY IN JORDAN, AS WELL AS IN THE REST OF THE ARAB WORLD, EXPECT INCREASED POLITICAL RADICALIZATION (TOWARD THE LEFT, AND PERHAPS IN SOME AREAS TO THE RIGHT), A SHARPER SPLIT BETWEEN REJECTIONISTS AND

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MODERATES WITH CONSEQUENT DANGERS FOR MODERATE REGIMES AND A YENEWED EMPHASIS ON AN ANTI-ISRAEL HARDLINE, AS WELL AS A STRONG SWING OF THE PENDULUM AWAY FROM THE U.S. TO A RE-NEWED FLIRTATION WITH THE SOVIET UNION. WE WOULD AGREE WITH

THIS VIEW AT LEAST TO THE EXTENT THAT MODERATE REGIMES, PARTICULARLY JORDAN'S, WOULD COME UNDER HEAVY PRESSURE FROM THE REJECTIONISTS TO ABANDON MODERATE POLICIES. IN SUCH A SITUATION, JORDAN WOULD BE THE MODERATE, ASIDE FROM CHAOTIC LEBANON, MOST SUSCEPTIBLE TO OUTSIDE PRESSURES. WE WOULD NOT RULE OUT SPECIFIC MILITARY INITIATIVES (IN ADDITION TO THE EVER PRESENT GENERAL THREAT) FROM SYRIA, IRAQ, OR BOTH, TO INFLUENCE JORDAN'S POLICIES OR EVEN TO TRY TO CHANGE THE REGIME. THIS MIGHT BE THE CASE PARTICULARLY IF JORDAN REFUSED TO OPEN ITS BORDERS FOR ATTACKS ON ISRAEL IF SOUTHERN LEBANON IS CLOSED TO THE PLO.

6. JORDAN OF COURSE PRESENTS NO REAL THREAT TO ISRAEL; HOWEVER, IF NEGOTIATIONS FAIL, JORDAN MIGHT BE REQUIRED TO DEFEND ITS TERRITORY AGAINST A POSSIBLE PRE-EMPTIVE STRIKE BY ISRAEL AGAINST SYRIA THROUGH NORTHWEST JORDAN. WHATEVER OUR ATTITUDE TO SUCH AN OPERATION MIGHT BE AT THE TIME, NO JORDANIAN REGIME COULD SURVIVE INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY WHICH DID NOT TAKE DEFENSIVE ACTION TO PROTECT ITS TERRITORY. BY THE SAME TOKEN, TO BE POLITICALLY SUSTAINABLE, THE JORDANIAN/U.S. MILITARY RELATION MUST BE SEEN AS ONE WHICH PROVIDES THE GOJ THE CAPABILITY TO MOUNT A CREDIBLE SHORTRUN (SEVERAL DAYS TO TWO WEEKS) DEFENSE OF ITS TERRITORY, EVEN AGAINST OVERWHELMINGLY SUPERIOR FORCES. IF NEGOTIATIONS ARE ABORTED, THE MAINTENANCE OF A STABLE, MODERATE JORDAN WOULD BE AT LEAST AS IMPORTANT TO OUR INTERESTS IN THE MIDEAST AS IT IS NOW; TO BE ABLE TO MAINTAIN THE

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INTEGRITY OF ITS MODERATE POSITION, JORDAN MUST BE ABLE TO WITHSTAND SIGNIFICANT MILITARY PRESSURE, DIRECT OR IMPLIED.

7. IN SUM, WHATEVER THE COURSE OF PEACE NEGOTIATIONS, WE BELIEVE IT WILL CONTINUE TO BE IN THE U.S. INTEREST TO MAINTAIN A STABLE, MODERATE JORDAN, CAPABLE OF A REASONABLE MILITARY DEFENSE AGAINST THREATS TO ITS SECURITY AND HENCE CAPABLE OF MAINTAINING ITS POLICIES IN THE FACE OF POLITICAL/MILITARY PRESSURES FROM ITS NEIGHBORS. WE BELIEVE THIS REQUIRES THAT WE GIVE SUSTAINED SUPPORT TO THE KIND OF REASONABLE MINIMUM FORCE MODERNIZATION SET FORTH IN REF. A.

8. FUNDING: WE BELIEVE THERE ARE SEVERAL OPTIONS FOR FUNDING THE DOLS 975 MILLION FORCE-MODERNIZATION PROGRAM DESCRIBED IN REF. A. GIVEN CONGRESSIONAL RESTRICTIONS, AN INCREASE IN GRANT ASSISTANCE WOULD SEEM TO BE THE MOST DIFFICULT, IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE

CONGRESS HAS BEEN PREPARED TO APPROVE ADDITIONAL AMOUNTS
OF FMS CREDIT FOR VARIOUS STATES. FOR JORDAN, THE PROBLEM
WITH FMS CREDIT IS THE NEED TO FIND THIRD PARTIES TO REPAY
AT LEAST THE PRINCIPAL; THE EMBASSY AND THE DEPARTMENT HAVE
CONCISTENTLY AND EMPHATICALLY TAKEN THE VIEW THAT JORDANIAN

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ECONOMY IS NOT SUFFICIENTLY STRONG TO MANAGE THESE BURDENS
ON ITS OWN, AND AS LONG AS THE U.S. CONTINUES TO
PROVIDE BUDGET SUPPORT, IT WOULD BO VERY ILL-ADVISED FOR
THE U.S. ALSO TO GET INVOLVED IN A PROGRAM IN WHICH
JORDAN HAD TO ASSUME THE BURDEN OF FMS PAYMENTS. WE
BELIEVE ADDITIONAL FUNDS WILL BE REQUIRED, AND THAT THE
TOTAL OF DOLS 180 MILLION PER YEAR FOR FY80 - FY85 IS
THE MINIMUM PROGRAM WHICH THE U.S. SHOULD SUPPORT.

9. WE SEE THEN SEVERAL OPTIONS:

(A) INCREASED FMS, WITH GRANT ASSISTANCE MAIN-
TAINED OR GRADUALLY REDUCED. THE DOLS 180 MILLION
TO BE PROVIDED WOULD INCLUDE FY79 LEVEL OF DOLS 45
MILLION IN GRANT ASSISTANCE AND AN INCREASE WNFMS
CREDIT FROM DOLS 75 MILLION TO DOLS 135 MILLION.
WE ASSUME JORDAN WOULD LOOK TO SAUDI ARABIA AS THE
PRIMARY STATE GUARANTEEING TO REPAY THE PRINCIPAL
ON THE CREDIT.

(B) OPTION A WITH THE ADDITION OF THE IDEA OF A
CONSORTIUM OF OIL-RICH STATES TO GUARANTEE THE
PRINCIPAL OR PRINCIPAL AND INTEREST ON THE FMS
FUNDS, RATHER THAN SAUDI ARABIA ALONE AS HERETOFORE.
UNDER THIS OPTION, GIVEN THE FACT OF A U.S. COMMIT-

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MENT TO INCREASED CREDIT FUNDS FOR JORDAN, JORDAN WOULD SEEK TO GAIN A LONGER TERM COMMITMENT FROM A GROUP OF OIL-RICH ARAB STATES TO COVER REPAYMENT OF THE PRINCIPAL OR THE PRINCIPAL AND INTEREST. THESE STATES MIGHT INCLUDE SAUDI ARABIA WHICH COULD CONTINUE TO SUPPORT JORDAN WITH A NEW COMMITMENT OF PERHAPS DOLS 75 MILLION PER YEAR, (IN ADDITION TO PRESENT GUARANTEES) AND THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES AND QATAR, WHICH COULD COVER THE REMAINING DOLS 60 MILLION REQUIRED. JORDAN WOULD PRESUMABLY BE ABLE TO INDICATE THAT SUCH SUPPORT WOULD BE THE FULL REQUEST FOR THE 1980-1985 TIME PERIOD FROM THESE STATES FOR MILITARY EQUIPMENT, AND MIGHT EVEN BE WILLING TO ACCEPT THESE SUMS IN LIEU OF THE RABAT SUMMIT PAYMENTS TYOM THESE STATES WHICH HAVE BEEN PROMISED, BUT NEVER REGULARLY DELIVERED.

(C) THIS OPTION WOULD ALSO INTRODUCE THE IDEA OF "CREDIT FORGIVENESS" ON THE ISRAELI MODEL. WE HAVE ALREADY SEEN TH M JORDAN HAS MADE A STUDY OF U. S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE SUPPORT TO ISRAEL IN RECENT YEARS. WE KNOW THAT JORDAN IS FULLY AWARE OF THE FACT THAT UP TO 50 PERCENT OF THE FMS CREDIT FOR ISRAEL DOES NOT HAVE TO BE REPAID AND IS THUS IN SENSE A GRANT PROGRAM. SUCH A PROPOSAL WOULD BE EXTREMELY ATTRACTIVE TO JORDAN. IN ADDITION, IF SOME PERCENTAGE OF JORDAN'S CREDIT WERE FORGIVEN, THE UNDERWRITING OR REPAYMENT RESPONSIBILITIES OF THIRD STATES WOULD BE CONSIDERABLY REDUCED. ONE USEFUL VARIANT OF THIS PROPOSAL MIGHT BE TO REMOVE JORDAN FROM ALL GRANT ASSISTANCE WHILE FORGIVING 50 PERCENT OF THE DOLS 180 MILLION ANNUAL PACKAGE-- DOLS 90 MILLION. THE ADDITIONAL DOLS 90 MILLION OULD BE GUARANTEED BY AN OIL STATTLCONSORTIUM AS OUTLINED ABOVE.LA FURTHER VARIANT IN THIS AND OTHER PACK-
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AGES MIGHT BE TO INCORPORATE SOME REDUCED FMS INTEREST RATES RESULTING FROM DIRECT FMS CREDIT RATHER THAN CREDIT GUARANTEED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE THROUGH THE FEDERAL FINANCING BANK. THIS WOULD SEEM TO BE ESPECIALLY APPROPRIATE IF THE OIL STATE CONSORTIUM WERE PREPARED TO UNDERTAKE DIRECT OBLIGATIONS TO THE U.S. TO REPAY THE AMOUNT INVOLVED ON A REGULAR, FIXED BASIS.

10. WE RECOGNIZE THAT THE IDEA OF CREDIT FORGIVENESS MIGHT

BE THE MOST DIFFICULT WITH RESPECT TO THE CONGRESS; HOWEVER, A DEMONSTRATION THAT WE ARE WILLING TO USE FUNDING FOR JORDAN IN A WAY SIMILAR TO WHAT WE DO FOR ISRAEL WOULD HAVE AN EXTREMELY FAVORABLE RESPONSE IN JORDAN AND THROUGHOUT THE ARAB WORLD FROM A POLITICAL POINT OF VIEW. INDEED, IT COULD BE SEEN AS A LOGICAL FOLLOW-ON TO THE AIRPLANE PACKAGE DEAL WITH RESPECT TO ITS RAMIFIED POLITICAL EFFECTS IN THE REGION. JORDAN HAVING NOT BEEN INCLUDED IN THE AIRCRAFT PACKAGE DEAL WOULD OF COURSE FIND THE SUGGESTION EXTREMELY HELPFUL. FROM THE CONGRESSIONAL VIEW POINT, AND THAT OF OTHER FMS RECIPIENTS AROUND THE WORLD, WE ALREADY HAVE THE ISRAELI PRECEDENT AND WE BELIEVE AN ARGUMENT CAN BE MADE THAT ISRAEL AND JORDAN ARE RATHER UNIQUE CASES, BOTH ENTWINED IN THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS, AND BOTH LONG-STANDING FRIENDS OF THE U.S. AND NEEDY RECIPIENTS.

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THE USE OF THIS SORT OF EXPLANATION COULD FORM A BLOCK AAINST FURTHER EXPANSION OF THE CONCEPT TO OTHER AREAS OR OTHER STATES. FINALLY, AN ARAB OIL CONSORTIUM UNDERWRITING THE FMS CREDIT WOULD BE MORE MORE LIKELY TO PARTICIPATE IN AN ARRANGEMENT WHEN THE U.S. WAS ALSO SEEN TO BE EXPANDINGITS ASSISTANCE TO JRRDAN AT THE SAME TIME.

11. RECOMMENDATION: WE BELIEVE DOLS 180 MILLION TOTAL ANNUAL FUNDING REQUIREMENT FY1980 - FY1985 SHOULD BE MET ON AN ANNUAL BASIS AS FOLLOWS:
--U.S. CONTRIBUTION: DOLS 90(MILLION CONSISTING OF DOLS 45 MILLION INGRANT ASSISTANCE AND DOLS 45 MILLION IN FORGIVEN CREDIT OR ALTERNATIVELY ABOLITION OF GRANT ASSISTANCE AND A FORGIVEN CREDIT OF DOLS 90 MILLION.
--OIL PRODUCTY'S CONTRIBUTION: REPAYMENT OF DOLS 90 MILLION IN U.S. FMS CREDIT LOANS FOR JORDAN IDEALLY COVERING BOTH

THE PRINCIPAL AND THE INTEREST TO BE ARRANGED BY GOJ.

12. WE BELIEVE IT IS CLEAR THAT WE SHOULD
SUPPORT A RELATIVELY MODERATE SUSTAINED PROGRAM OF
FORCE MODERNIZATION OUTLINED REF. A FOR REASONS ABOVE. THE
PROVISION OF APPROPRIATE U.S. SUPPORT MAY WELL REQUIRE
CREATIVE USE OF AVAILABLE FINANCING MECHANISMS; WE REQUEST
FULL DEPARTMENT/DEFENSE EVALUATION OF THE MODERNIZATION
PROGRAM, AND A STUDY OF WAYS IN WHICH ASSISTANCE MIGHT BE
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PROVIDED.

13. IN FINAL ANALYSIS, KING HUSSEIN VIEWS THIS NOT ONLY
AS MILITARY ASSISTANCE MATTER, BUT ALSO IN CONTEXT OF OUR
CONTINUING POLITICAL SUPPORT. HE KNOWS OUR GENERAL ARMS
CONTROL POLICIES MAKE FAVORABLE DECISIONS ON HIS PACKAGE
EXTREMELY PAINFUL, AND HE MAY REGARD OUR WILLINGNESS TO
BITE THIS BULLET AS AN IMPORTANT INDICATION OUR
FIRMNESS AND STAYING POWER WITH JORDAN IN THE FAR MORE
TRYING CHALLENGES OF ARRANGING A FINAL MIDEAST SETTLEMENT.
ON THE POLITICAL LEVEL, KING HUSSEIN WILL WANT TO HAVE
SOME CONFIDENCE THAT OUR CURRENT MIDEAST PEACE EFFORTS CAN
REASONABLY BE SEEN TO LEAD TO SOMETHING POSITIVE ON
THE WEST BANK BEFORE HE AGREES TO ENTER THE NEGOTIATIONS.
HOWEVER, IN OUR VIEW, EVEN THIS WILL NOT BE SUFFICIENT TO
GET HUSSEIN TO PARTICIPATE UNLESS AT THE SAME TIME HE HAS
A U.S. COMMITMENT TO INCREASE OUR SUPPORT TO ENSURE
JORDAN'S MILITARY SECURITY AGAINST THE PERILS OF SUCCESS
OR FAILURE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. IN ESSENCE, WE
BELIEVE THIS DOLS 180 MILLION ANNUAL ASSISTANCE LEVEL IS
THE U.S. ASSISTANCE REQUIREMENT FOR JORDAN'S FUTURE
INVOLVEMENT IN THE MIDEAST NEGOTIATIONS. WE SHOULD NOT
DECEIVE OURSELVES THAT WE CAN ESCAPE THIS REQUIREMENT
AND STILL OBTAIN KING HUSSEIN'S AGREEMENT TO TAKE THE
SIGNIFICANT POLITICAL AND MILITARY RISKS REQUIRED TO JOIN
THE SADAT INITIATIVE.
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